Summary. Ð The implicit but widespread assumption regarding nongovernmental ®nancial institutions in Bangladesh has been that they are indeed placed in special poverty-stricken areas. Is this assumption valid? If not, what factors aect programs placement across communities? Using thana-level data to analyze the geographic placement of three credit programs in Bangladesh, this paper provides evidence that branches tend to be located in poor pockets of relatively welldeveloped areas than in remoter, less developed regions. Client density of established branches does not exhibit such a feature and actually tends to be better in less advantageous locations. Ó
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Bangladesh has made major strides in delivering ®nancial services to the rural poor. These services have been delivered mainly by innovative group-based credit programs run by several nongovernmental organization (NGOs) . A number of studies describe how these new institutional arrangements dispensed with physical collateral and facilitated access of the poor to savings and credit services (Zeller, Sharma, and Ahmed, 1996; Hossain, 1988) . Only scant attention has so far been given, however, to the determinants of placement of NGO branches and the client coverage of their operations across regions. Khandker, Khalily, and Khan (1995) ®nd that commercial banks in Bangladesh favor wellendowed areas, and Binswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig (1993) conclude that Indian commercial banks were more likely to be located where the road infrastructure and marketing system are relatively developed. Is this also the case with group-based credit systems of NGOs? In other words, do NGO programs target their services to the poor in relatively underdeveloped or disadvantaged regions or do they locate their branches in the relatively better endowed areas? What kinds of tensions arise between organizational goals and performance standards and/or requirements at the operations level? Once branches have been placed, what does client coverage look like across branches? For example, do the decisions on branch placement and client coverage follow similar patterns, or is there evidence of discontinuity? To what extent does the decision related to client coverage appear to be decentralized (Ravallion and Wodon, 1998) ? Knowing whether certain types of areas are systematically favored or disfavored is of interest and importance to policy-makers as well as to program managers. This knowledge can also assist in disentangling program eects from location eects and hence is useful for an assessment of the impact of group-based credit programs (Pitt, Rosenzweig and Gibbons, 1995) . This paper uses secondary-level data from 391 administrative units termed thanas 1 to examine the placement of branches and group coverage of three well-known NGO credit institutions in Bangladesh: Association of Social Advancement (ASA), Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), and PROSHIKA. Section 2 describes major characteristics of these NGO institutions (see Zeller, Sharma and Ahmed, 1996 for more detail). Section 3 ®rst outlines a framework for analyzing placement decisions of Bangladeshi NGOs and then proposes a number of hypotheses on placement of branches that were tested econometrically. Section 4 presents the World Development Vol. 27, No. 12, pp. 2123±2136, 1999 Ó 1999 economic speci®cation, while Sections 5 and 6 present results on branch placement and client coverage respectively. Section 6 summarizes ®ndings and policy implications. The study concludes that because the multiple objectives of the NGOs introduce considerable tension in service placement decisions of NGOs, organizational innovations that reduce such tensions will serve to strengthen institutions. The paper summarizes with a number of speci®c recommendations in this regard.
THE INSTITUTIONS
There are ®ve common threads that weave around the institutional structures of the ASA, BRAC, and PROSHIKA: First, services are strictly targeted to a well-de®ned set of clients. The most common criterion is the amount of land owned and all three NGOs target landless or near-landless households. Second, credit is always provided to small groups of borrowers on the basis of joint liability and without the pledging of physical collateral. Third, even though loans are made to individual members, the entire group is denied further credit when outstanding arrears exist for any one of the members. Fourth, lending activities are supplemented by training activities in areas ranging from entrepreneurial skill development, management of microenterprises such as shopkeeping, crafts production, etc., to education on social awareness and family planning activities. Fifth, groups are required to contribute to an emergency fund that may be used when members experience household and other emergencies.
Loan recovery rates of all three institutions are impressive when compared with those of commercial banks: During 1992±93, for example, they were 100% for ASA, 98% for BRAC, and 93% for PROSHIKA. Additional institution-speci®c details are as follows:
(a) Association for social advancement (ASA) ASA, one of the largest indigenous NGOs in Bangladesh, was set up in 1978. It implements programs in the areas of income generation, integrated health, and education and empowerment of the poor and its Income Generation through Credit Program (IGCP) was launched in 1989. The principal objective of the program is to increase income levels and purchasing power of the poor households.
ASA extends credit facilities to the female members of the poor households for investment in various income-generating activities. The major income-generating activities receiving support under the IGCP program are paddy husking, cow/goat rearing, poultry farming, small trading and handicrafts. Nearly 190,000 members received loan under the program in 1993.
(b) Bangladesh rural advancement committee (BRAC)
BRAC was set up in 1972, following the independence of the country in 1971. At its birth the primary goal of BRAC was to participate in the post-independence rehabilitation work of the war-ravaged country. It began with a small rehabilitation project in Sylhet district in the northeast of Bangladesh. Gradually BRAC expanded its operations to other parts of the country. BRAC initiated its credit program in 1976 (BRAC, 1991) . The present form of the program, which was introduced in 1990, is known as the Rural Credit Project (RCP). RCP is an important component of its larger Rural Development Project (RDP). The objectives of RDP are fourfold: (i) to generate employment opportunity for both males and females, (ii) to mobilize under-and unutilized resources (iii) to assist in diusing appropriate technology in the rural areas, and (iv) to promote better health care. The cumulative amount of loan disbursed through RCP during 1990±92 stood at Tk 1,745 million and during 1992, short-term loans accounted for 94% of total disbursement. Loans are generally extended for a speci®ed line of projects. In 1992, for example, rural trading and food processing accounted for nearly 73% of the loans. Livestock, agriculture, rural industry, and irrigation account for another 23%. As of June 1993, 70 branches of RCP were in operation with a coverage of 379,000 members.
(c) Proshika manobik unnayan kendra (PROSHIKA)
PROSHIKA was founded in 1976 with the aim of empowering the poor by enabling them to participate in mainstream economic activities. Its objectives include achieving structural poverty alleviation, improving status of women, and increasing people's participation in public institutions. PROSHIKA operates group saving and revolving loan activities under its Employment and Income Generating (EIG) program. The revolving loan program was launched in 1983 and in the 1992±93 ®nancial year funded 10,809 projects, disbursing nearly Tk. 224 million.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE PLACEMENT OF BRANCHES
When guided by the sole objective of maximizing pro®ts, the decision to place a branch in a particular location is relatively straightforward as it can be based on standard invest theory: it makes sense to open an additional outlet whenever the discounted value of expected revenues from a new service center is at least as high as the discounted total cost of the establishing and operating the branch. Of course, this decision may be additionally complicated by whether the organizationÕs entry in the market is big enough to in¯uence prices. Moreover, before resources are committed, the ®rm is free to choose the scale of operations based on its knowledge of expected demand, and this decision will aect the unit cost of supplying services. Once a branch opensÐthat is, once resources are committed, and the scale of operation ®xedÐthe service volume in the short-run (during the time in which scale is ®xed) is provided such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Of course, the possibility of expanding the scale of operations in the future remains: this decision would depend on expected changes in the demand for services, and to the extent moving on to a larger scale of operation brings about substantial reduction in unit costs of providing services. The organization is also free to shut down the branch: this it will do if variable costs are no longer covered by revenue.
Can the above framework be applied to analyze placement and outreach decisions of the Bangladeshi NGOs? The answer is no mainly because pro®t is not a principal aim of these organizations. We outline two important considerations that are likely to aect branch placement and client outreach decisions of the NGOs. First, as indicated in an earlier section, all the three NGOs came into being principally as a response to the challenge of delivering basic social services to the poor further impoverished, at that time, by a devastating war of liberation. The management decision within these organizations were/are therefore primarily responsive to goals underlined in their original mission or charter. Second, this original mission is likely to be modi®ed by at least one other important consideration: the interest represented by the principal ®nanciers of the institutions, composed of international as well as national donors. All three NGOs received and/or continue to receive funding from such sources and, by implication, are likely to be bound by conditionalities accompanying these funding arrangements. We argue that these conditionalities relate primarily to maintaining some minimum standard of ®nancial performance (e.g., caps on deliquency rates and administrative costs) and demonstrating some minimum level of positive program impact. Below, we propose that ful®lling original organizational objectives as well as conditionalities imposed by ®nanciers results in four speci®c considerations in branch placement and client coverage: poverty targeting; expected demand for services; cost of supplying services; and percieved riskiness in operations. An econometric model incorporating these considerations is speci®ed and then tested in subsequent sections.
The placement rule followed by NGOs is speci®ed in equation (1) where the decision to place a branch, B i , by an NGO credit institution is speci®ed as a function of
, is a vector that describes poverty conditions in thana i; E(D i ), the expected level of demand for credit services in that thana; E(C i ), the expected level of cost of providing services, and R i , an index of the riskiness of conducting credit-related business in the thana. Each of these are discussed below.
(a) Poverty targeting
All three NGOs, who are among the largest in the micro-®nance NGO movement in Bangladesh (Credit and Development Forum, 1996) , claim to be guided, ®rst and foremost, by a common mission to serve the poorest in the rural areas (ASA, 1996a, b; Lovell, 1992; BRAC, 1994) . ASA, which provides credit exclusively to women, for example, aims at creating``a broader space for marginalized women of rural areas as they can participate in income generation activities to increase income '' ASA (1994, p. 4) . BRAC, on the other hand, aims to work``exclusively with disadvantaged sections of the community'' (Chowdhury, Mahmood, and Abed, 1991, p. 4) and focuses on poor landless groups, and PROS-HIKA has an explicit mission to``empower the poor'' (Jahangir and Zeller, 1995) . Given these kinds of mission statements, a reasonable hypothesis is that, conditional upon other factors, thanas with higher poverty levels will have a higher probability of a branch placement.
There are, however, two additional questions: What criteria of poverty do these institutions apply with respect to individuals in targeting their operations and what criteria do these institutions apply in making the operational decisions on which areas to target their activities. The answer to the ®rst question is relatively straightforward. All three programs have clear and strict poverty-based eligibility rules that are well enforced. BRAC lends only to the individual who owns less than 0.5 acres of land and also works as a laborer for at least 100 days in a year (Lovell, 1992) . ASA, on the other hand, lends to women owning less than 0.5 acres of land and whose income does not exceed Tk 1200 per month and who also sell their labor for at least 200 days a year. The response of NGOs to the dierences in poverty levels between dierent locations in making the decisions about placement of their branches is a more dicult question, however. A reasonable assumption is that the NGOs base their decisions on various types of indicators of poverty. One testable hypothesis is that NGOs locate their branches in thanas that have a larger proportion of households owning less than 0.5 acres of landÐas this criterion most closely de®nes their target households. This need not be the only criterion, however. To explore other criteria, two additional measures are proposed in this study: thanawise literacy rates and thana-wise levels of`d istress'' index developed by the Helen Keller Institute (HKI) in Dhaka, Bangladesh (Helen Keller International, 1994) in operationalizing the vulnerability-focus of its program. Literacy rates generally are highly correlated with poverty levels, and the HKI distress index combines information on susceptibility tō ooding (a frequently occurring natural disaster in Bangladesh), general wage levels, and availability of irrigation facilitiesÐall major factors aecting the level of well-being in Bangladesh.
(b) Expected level of demand for credit services
The expected level of demand for credit services in an area is likely to receive important consideration for two reasons. First, it is important for the NGOs to avoid areas where credit demand is likely to be either nonexistent or lower than some minimum threshold that makes credit delivery prohibitively costly to administer. Second, the marginal impact of NGO services on participating households, a major concern for the NGOs, is likely to be the highest in areas with the strongest credit demand. This is because credit demand is likely to be the strongest in areas that are aected relatively less by other accompanying constraintsÐon labor and product markets, transportation, and information. Hence, expected demand for credit is expressed as:
where the vector W i consists of thana-level variables that aect the level of credit demand and may include the following variables: Ðlevel of physical infrastructural development such as access to markets, roads, and electricity, irrigation and other services, Ðagroclimatic conditions, and general income levels, and Ðlevel of urbanization and commercialization of the local economy.
(c) Cost of supplying services
As indicated before, while pro®t-seeking institutions select locations where expected revenues are at least as high as expected total cost, this may not necessarily be the case of NGOs as their main goal is not pro®t maximization. Further, NGOs receive subsidies of dierent types to operate in speci®c geographical areas and also implement various types of cross-subsidization schemes between branches. For this reason they are not likely to base their placement decision solely on potential net revenues. How expected unit costs operation aect placement of branches, hence, is essentially an empirical issue.
There at least two other cost-related issues, however, that are likely to be important in the placement calculation. These concern general security operations and the availability of banking services. Credit transactions that involve handling of cash can raise security concerns. Proximity to a police station and other law and order establishments may therefore be important. Moreover, when NGOs do not provide their own banking services but depend on the branch of a commercial or parastatal bank to make cash disbursements and deposits, then convenient proximity to commercial banks becomes important. If commercial banks are generally located in areas that are more urbanized or bene®t from better infrastructure (as Khandkar and Binswanger have shown), then NGOs may also tend to place branches in or near these locations.
A third issue relates to stang of branches: since branch managers are recruited from a central pool, and since salaries and other compensations do not reward appointments in more remote locations, managers are likely to prefer locations that have fairly well-developed services (education, market, health). If these considerations are signi®cant in the decisionmaking process, placement will be higher in thanas which have such services.
To account for all these consideration, we let the expected total cost function be speci®ed as:
where the vector Z i consists thana-level variables that aect the level of unit service delivery costs. In practice, vectors W i in (2) and Z i are likely to be very similar if not identical.
(d) Perceived riskiness
An important goal of NGOs administering credit programs is to maintain high repayment rates. Indeed, as noted earlier, all NGO programs report repayment rates in excess of 90%. Maintaining near-perfect repayment rates is critical for NGOs because most of the subsidies they receive from national and international donors appear to be conditional on maintaining such rates. This objective of maintaining high repayment rates 2 may also aect the placement of branches. In particular, NGOs are likely to avoid areas where marginal returns from new microenterprises are low (poor, backward areas where complementary services either do not exist or are highly inadequate). They are also likely to avoid areas which are highly susceptible to natural disasters such as¯ooding and other covariate risks. We let the risk expectation function be speci®ed as:
Elements in V i include poverty indicators such as literacy rate, level and distribution of landholding, and also the HKI distress level indicator described earlier.
ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
A linear speci®cation of the placement equation (1), upon substituting for (2)±(4) would be:
As indicated in the previous section, however, it is in principle (and also due to data limitations) very dicult to identify P i , W, Z, and V separately. For example, it is very dicult to ®nd variables that aect poverty levels but not credit demand, or riskiness of conducting business. A more practical formulation is therefore to regard the elements in P, W, Z, and V to be common and represented by the vector X i , as:
and interpreting its coecient g i a i b i c i d i as the combined eects of the four determinants of placement. After all, infrastructure, urbanization, other community-level endowments are likely to aect jointly levels of poverty as well as demand for credit services, the cost of credit service delivery, and the riskiness of conducting business. Similarly, susceptibility to natural disasters simultaneously aects poverty, credit demand patterns and the riskiness and costs of doing business. Note that a priori expectations on the sign of g i are dicult to place unless a i , b i , c i , and d i are of the same expected signs. It is possible, however to make inferences based on the signs of the estimated coecients on the relative strengths of some subset of the variables. Another consideration is the eect of unobservables. If placement of government infrastructural programs as well as levels of poverty are functions of unobservable factors such as agro-climatic potentials of lands, historical or political considerations, then exclusion of such factors in equation (6) is likely to lead to biased estimates of the gs. In order to minimize bias arising out of location-speci®c unobservables, a district-level eect of l d is included in equation (6). Since B i in (6) is a binary dependent variable taking the value of one whenever there is branch of the NGO in a thana and zero otherwise, the equation is estimated using the ®xed eects logit estimation that wipes the eects of district-level unobservables.
The vector X in (6) contains the following variables (see Table 1 (BRAC, 1994; ASA, 1994; Grameen Bank, 1994) . The data for PROSHIKA also refer to 1994, and were obtained through interviews with sta from its headquarters in Dhaka. 
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS: PLACEMENT OF BRANCHES
Placement of branch equations were estimated for all the three NGOs taken together and for each separately. These are discussed below.
(a) All NGOs
The estimated logit equation where the dependent variable takes on a value of one when a branch of at least one of the three NGOs exists in the thana and zero otherwise is presented in Table 2 . A number of interesting results are discussed below. The coecients of ROAD and POSTOFFICE are positive and signi®cant at the 5% level. These are both infrastructural variables measuring the extent of transportation and communication facilities in the thana. The percentage of urban population in the thana (URBAN) and population density (DENSITY) are not statistically signi®cant. Neither are the two health service indicators (HOSPITAL) and (DOCTOR), the number of market centers in the thana (MARKET), or the percentage of villages that are electri®ed in the thana (ELECTRICITY). It appears therefore that placement decisions are attentive to transportation and communication facilities, but that the net eect of other infrastructural facilities measured or proxied by population concentration, urbanization, and the availability of medical and health services appears to be insigni®cant.
The coecient of LITERATE is negative and is strongly signi®cant. Hence placement of branches appears to respond to literacy ratesÐwith more branches being placed in thanas with lower literacy rates. Note that if considerations of demand, costs, and riskiness favor thana with higher literacy ratesÐthat is, if b litertate c litertate d litertate b 0Ðthen it may be concluded that the poverty consideration (a literate ) is suciently large to overturn the combined positive eect so that the net eect is negative; that is, ja litert j b jb litert c litert d litert j. The coecient of the landholding variable LANDSIZE has a similar interpretationÐthat the poverty eects of the smaller land size more than outweighs the combined eects on credit demand and risk costs. LANDSIZE, however, is not signi®cant at the 10% level.
The coecient of DISTRESS is negative and signi®cant at the 5% level. NGOs thus are less likely to place branches in high distress locations. Unlike in the case of LITERATE above, it appears that poverty considerations (that are attendant with high level distress) are not strong enough to compensate for the negative eects arising out of conducting business in risk-prone areas. Signi®cantly, this result indicates the inability of even large NGOs, such as BRAC and ASA, to eectively deal with risks.
Overall, the estimated branch placement equation indicates that while NGOs appear to respond to poverty (at least to the extent that they correlate with literacy levels), they are more likely to place branches in locations that already have favorable infrastructure. They also are less likely to place branches in high distress location. 
GROUP-BASED CREDIT ORGANIZATIONS 2129 (b) NGO-speci®c equations
The equations describing thana-level placement of branches of ASA, BRAC, and PROSHIKA are presented in Tables 3±5. The explanatory variables are the same as in the combined regression in Table 2 except for one extra consideration: the response of a NGO to pre-existing branches of other NGOs. On the one hand, it may be the case that NGOs prefer to work in exclusive markets, in the absence of any competition or any other types of in¯uences from other providers of similar services.
3 On the other hand, it may also be the case that pre-existing branches of other NGOs in a particular location may signal to a potential entrant a community's positive social capital that contributes to social receptivity and successful operation of group-based programs. If this is the case, clustering of NGOs may be observed. How NGOs respond to pre-existing branches of other NGOs is hence an empirical question. For this reason, an indicator variable PRIORCOMP that takes the value one whenever the branch of another group-based NGO in the thana existed prior to the placement of a branch of the NGO in question is used in the regression equation. For example, in the BRAC equation, the indicator variable would equal one whenever an ASA branch existed in the thana prior to the establishment of the BRAC branch and would equal zero otherwise. In thanas that do not have a BRAC branch yet, PRIORCOMP 1 if there is already an ASA branch and zero otherwise. Hence the estimated coecient would indicate the extent to which the existence of a similar institution operating in the area aects the decision to establish a branch. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, data on year of branch establishment were available for BRAC and ASA, but not for PROSHIKA. Therefore, the indicator variables are used only in the BRAC and ASA regressions. In addition, because BRACÕs group-based credit operation was established well before ASAÕs (Jahangir and Zeller, 1995) , a subset of observations that includes data only after 1987 when ASAÕs credit programs were fully initiated was used in the analysis. The results of the estimated ®xed-eects logit equations are discussed below.
ÐThe coecient of PRIORCOMP in both the ASA and the BRAC equations are negative and signi®cant indicating that both ASA and BRAC are less likely to establish branches in locations that already have à`c ompetitorÕs'' branch. ÐThe coecient of the percentage of population owning less than half an acre of land (LANDSIZE) is positive and signi®cant at the 5% level in both the ASA and BRAC equations, though this is not the case with the PROSHIKA equation. On the other hand, the coecients of literacy rate (LITERATE) are negative in all the three NGO-speci®c equations, though they are statistically signi®cant only in the BRAC and PROSHIKA equations. Note also that LITERATE is the only signi®cant variable in the PROSHIKA equation. The NGO-speci®c equations thus are indicative of placement decisions responding to poverty conditions, especially BRACÕs which respond to both literacy and landholding levels.( Note that the land holding variable was not signi®cant in the combined NGO regression in Table 2 .) ÐAs for the transport and communication variables, POSTOFFICE is positive and signi®cant at the 10% level in the BRAC equation while ROAD is positive and signi®cant in the ASA equation. This is an interesting result as BRAC aims to conduct its own banking services in the near future while ASA will continue to use banking services oered by commercial banks. It is therefore important for ASA to locate branches in areas that have better access to transport infrastructure because it is this type of area where commercial banks are located. ÐThe coecient for the DISTRESS variable, re¯ecting on covariate¯ood and other risks of distress in the thana, is negative and signi®cant only in the BRAC equation. ÐNone of the other variables are signi®cant in any of the equations. In the framework adopted here however it does not mean that the other variables are not considered at all in the placement decision. It just means that their net eect through the four factors (poverty, demand, cost, and riskiness) are not signi®cantly dierent from zero.
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS: CLIENT COVERAGE
Having examined branch placement outcomes of the three NGOs, we now go on to examine factors that in¯uence the client outreach of thana-level branches. Apart from learning what types of poverty characteristics aect client density, it is also of interest to examine whether any type of decentralization process characterizes geographical distribution of service delivery. As Ravallion and Wodon (1998) point out, in many targeted programs, it may be case that headquarters makes a decision on where to place a branch, but subsequently leaves it up to local managers to determine the scale of operation of the established branch. Is this also the case of Bangladeshi NGOs? In this section, we use participation density (OUTREACH) measured as the number of participants in a speci®c program per 1,000 people in the thana as an indicator of client outreach.
The econometric speci®cation of the outreach regression equations is similar to the branch placement equation in (6) except that the dependent variable OUTREACH is a truncated variable: client coverage is observed only in thanas that have branches. The procedure used to correct this sample selection bias is the two-stage Heckman procedure (1979) whereby a Mills ratioÐLAMDAÐcomputed from the branch placement (logit) equation is used as an additional regressor in the participation density equation and appropriate adjustments are made in the computation of standard errors (Green, 1993 ). An additional variable YEARS is used in the outreach equation to control for the fact that client density is expected to increase with years of operation of the branch. YEARS is the number of years for which the branch has been in operation. But, because YEARS was not available for PROS-HIKA, the outreach equation was estimated using data only for BRAC and ASA with YEARS computed as the sum of years branches of both ASA and/or BRAC in the thana had been in operation. The combined outreach equation estimated for ASA and BRAC is presented in Table 6 .
In the outreach equation in Table 6 only the coecients of three variables are signi®cant: these are YEARS, LANDSIZE, and DISTRESS. These are discussed below.
ÐThe coecient of YEARS is positive and highly signi®cant, indicating that NGO institutions have expanded their client base through time. Indeed if it was the case that YEARS was the only variable signi®cant in the equation, this would suggest that, once a branch was placed in a particular location, client coverage was mostly determined without signi®cant reference to local speci®cities. This is not the case, however, since at least two other area characteristics appear to in¯uence outreach. ÐOutreach is signi®cantly higher in thanas that have a higher distress index. This result is completely opposite that of the placement equation which indicated that placement rule disfavored high distress areas. The result thus suggests that though branches are less likely to be placed in high distress areas, once established, they have higher client densities. This is a plausible scenario. First, it may be that demand for special ®nancial services such as those provided by the NGO institutions is especially large in these backward, high-risk thanas, especially since these areas are inadequately served by other market-based or government-sponsored organizations. Second, it may indeed be part of institution policy to have higher levels of outreach in relatively more depressed areas. Third, as suggested above, it may also be re¯ective of partial decentralization in service delivery whereby local branch managers, once the branch is set up, exercise control in outreach-related decision functions that are more responsive to local conditions. Indeed it may well be possible that high outreach requirements of branches placed in distressed areas may in fact put pressure on NGOs to limit the number of branches operating in such areas. Ð Outreach is signi®cantly lower in thanas that have a higher proportion of marginal farmers, as shown by the negative coecient of LANDSIZE. But it remains unclear whether this result is driven by supply or demand factors. In section 2 it was noted that a signi®cant proportion of the projects ®-nanced by NGOs were o-farm microenterprises engaging in rural trading, food processing, and handicraft production. If indeed ®nancing o-farm microenterprises (rather than agricultural production) is one of the main objectives of the NGO institutions, then outreach would be responsive not just to the proportion of the population owning less than 0.5 acres of land, but also to the presence of landless wage laborers who are likely to be even poorer. ÐThough it was clear from the placement equations that branches were more likely to be established in thanas with better communication and transportation infrastructure, there is no evidence that, once a branch is established, client outreach also responds to infrastructure-related characteristics. This once again suggests discontinuities between the placement and outreach decision functions. The NGO-speci®c equations in Tables 7±9  largely echo the ®ndings of the combined  equation in Table 6 and are therefore not discussed separately.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Our analysis indicates that even though NGOs were attentive to poverty considerations, branches were more likely to be established where there was better access to transport and communication infrastructure. Hence it appears that NGO services are geared more toward the poor who reside in relatively well-developed areas rather than toward the poor in more remote and less-developed regions. Client density of the existing branches, however, did not exhibit such a feature and actually tended to be better in less favorable and more``distressed'' locations.
Greater concentration of branches in the better endowed areas may in part be the result of a search for locations where the marginal impact of credit services is the greatest. Typically, accompanying constraints on production or incomeÐe.g., those imposed by the lack of markets, transportation, and/or communicationÐare likely to be less severe in areas that have good infrastructure. For example, loans for ®nancing the production of highly marketdependent outputsÐsuch as production of commercial crops, and other nonfarm micro enterprisesÐare less suitable for remote areas. Moreover, banking services are especially risky in remote areas where co-variance in household incomes is likely to be very high. In such areas, high repayment rates that are necessary to maintain NGOsÕ access to subsidized funds from various agencies are harder to achieve. Furthermore, the unavailability of commercial banks limits ®nancial operations in remote or poor locations. Hence, as suggested in the previous section, NGOs may follow a strategy of placing fewer branches in distressed areas, but with each of these branches serving a larger number of clients. The tension between poverty targeting and ensuring adequate ®nancial performance is thus quite clear in the way the NGOs place their services geographically.
If simultaneous eorts to reach the poor, to maximize marginal impact of services, and to keep loan delinquency at the minimum introduce considerable tension in service placement decisions of NGOs, solutions for reducing this 
